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Conflict Among Former Allies After Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon*

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The interesting theoretical question about civil war in general is not why it begins (the possible reasons are surely too many to enumerate) or why it stops (all sorts of contingent explanations from simple fatigue to outside force may apply) but why it so often does not resume when it might. We need to comprehend this process of conflict transformation, whereby the conflict either becomes less important or is pursued without using mass violence. Understandably, most analyses and prescriptions for peace-makers focus on relationships between former enemies and attempts to reduce incentives for them to take up arms again. However, a recent analysis of four negotiated settlements of civil wars (Sudan in 1972, Zimbabwe in 1980, Chad in 1987, and Lebanon in 1989) reveals that in all four cases the critical conflict was actually between former allies. The compromises required in negotiated settlements, combined with the other problems of post-civil war societies, make such conflicts likely. In some cases they led to violence; in Zimbabwe and Lebanon conflict again reached the level of civil war. However, the ironic result was that the countries that had experienced the most violence subsequently produced new settlements which essentially confirmed the original ones and appear to be holding. In Sudan, inter-allied violence was quite low, but the result was that the government changed its policy, the first settlement was undermined, and the original civil war began again. Outsiders should not assume either that wartime cooperation will continue in peace or that 'normal' peacetime behavior will naturally appear of its own accord. Indeed, they should probably anticipate that ad hoc wartime alliances are likely to dissolve with the risk of renewed civil violence.

Ending Civil Wars

Recently, much attention has been focused on the causes of civil strife. However, we still know relatively little about how such violence can be ended and how the participants

sometimes manage to come together to form a working political system. Indeed, the whole concept seems implausible. And yet we know it happens – every major state has gone through one or more such conflicts and somehow risen above them. Examples include the English Civil War, the French Revolution, the Thirty Years War in Germany, the American Revolution and Civil War, the Spanish Civil War, the Russian Revolution, the Chinese Civil War, and the Nigerian Civil War.

But how is this possible? How do people who have been killing one another with considerable skill and enthusiasm work together in a common political system? To put it

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Currently, of course, this is a hot policy
issue – how should outsiders respond to civil
violence in places like Bosnia, Sierra Leone,
and Burma? Assuming that these outsiders
are primarily interested in ending local viol-
ence, what should they attempt to do? The
standard American response seems to be to
encourage the sides to negotiate a settlement
both to end the immediate violence and to
lay the groundwork for a new political
system which will allow all members of
society to participate in a democratic gov-
ernment. Others contend that negotiated
settlements may not last as long as military
victories, either because they leave in place
the organizational structure which allows
losers in domestic politics to resort to viol-
ence at any time (Licklider, 1995; Wagner,
1993) or because, in ethnic conflicts in par-
ticular, separation may be a better response
(Bell-Fialkoff, 1996; Kaufman, 1996).

All sides in this debate focus on ensuring
that former enemies will not be so unhappy
with the outcome that they resume the *pre-
vious* civil war. In a number of cases this has
been quite successful, but it has always not
succeeded in preventing renewed violence.
*The problem is often a breakdown in relations
among former allies, not former foes.*

Termination of a civil war does not mean
the end of political conflict. We assume that
one of the problems of ending a civil war is
that both sides are likely to have fairly weak
leadership which will find it difficult to com-
promise; one of the hazards of the peace

process is being outbid by extremists.
William Zartman has offered the most
satisfying explanation of the conditions to
overcoming this problem in his notion of
the 'hurting stalemate'. The dominant
faction on each side at the same time must
expect that, if the conflict continues, its pos-
ition will be worse off in the foreseeable
future than if it settles. Settlement is thus
seen as a second-best solution; each side
would prefer to win, so settlement only
makes sense when winning is either not
available or too costly. Settlement then
depends on a shared view of the future, and
establishing agreement on the future is very
difficult. Thus there is the possible hazard
that rejectionists on both sides will refuse to
accept the necessity for settlement and
oppose it. This is a well-known problem of
the negotiating process, and third parties are
often used to influence the perception of the
future to make settlement seem a more
attractive option.

Stephen Stedman (1993) has argued that
every negotiated settlement has losers as well
as winners. Almost by definition the winners
of a negotiated settlement are a coalition of
members of both sides who find it in their
interest to settle. But the coalition will not
be total; there will be people and organiz-
ations on both sides who believe that their
interests are best served by continued viol-
ence. These people do not disappear after
the settlement has been reached. Ideally, we
would hope that their desires would be satis-
fied by opportunities to participate in a new,
more open government and by benefitting
from the economic benefits of peace. In
practice, participation does not guarantee
winning and the economic benefits may be
non-existent for some considerable time
(World Bank, 1995). The new government
may experience a 'honeymoon' for a short
time, but it will soon be confronted with the
same set of problems faced by the pre-civil
war government, with the added handicaps

of memories of mutual violence, widespread armaments, and greatly weakened social structures.

Given this argument, it is not surprising that *post-settlement political tensions often arise, not from reopening fissures between former foes but from deepening divisions among former allies.* The pattern seems to be that 'powerful losers' (Jones, 1996: 13–14), whose objectives were not gained by the settlement, find themselves in opposition to their former allies in the civil war. Certain groups or factions feel that they have not received their just desserts from the settlement or that the terms of the settlement threaten their interests or security. This tension mounts until either the former allies resort to violence against one another or the settlement supporters are forced to change policy and violate the settlement. Ironically, by undermining the settlement coalition and causing a renewal of the civil war, the original coalitions may reappear, and former allies who have become enemies will again become allies. (The most sophisticated analysis of this problem of 'spoilers' of peace agreements is Stedman, 1997.)

This rather unexpected conclusion emerged from an ongoing study of state formation after civil war funded in part by the United States Institute of Peace. Working from a revised version of Licklider's Civil War Termination Dataset of 84 civil wars from 1945–93, ten negotiated settlements were identified.[1] Four were examined in depth. The pattern of postwar conflict among allies appears in all cases. In

Zimbabwe, although it was a negotiated settlement, the government (white) side essentially disappeared once deprived of the control of the state because of its weak demographic base, less than 5% of the population. However, disputes among the former rebels eventually broke out into violence of such a level that it was a marginal civil war of its own. In Lebanon, Christians and Muslims reached an agreement, but the Christians subsequently fought among themselves. In Sudan, the North and South reached an agreement, but conflict among northern factions, particularly the Islamist group, resulted in abrogation of the settlement and a renewed civil war among the original parties. In Chad, the Habré government negotiated a series of settlements with different groups, but their allies objected to the terms of settlement. In all of these cases, allies quickly turned into enemies, sometimes reigniting the earlier war and sometimes starting new ones.

Sudan 1972–83: Nimeiri Destroys His Own Settlement

The first Sudanese civil war (1963–71) was a remarkably complex process in which various groups changed alliances over time. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to say that it was essentially a war of secession by the peoples of the South, who are predominantly African and not Muslim, from a government which they felt was dominated by northeners, many of whom see themselves as Arab and are Muslim. In the middle of the war, President Nimeiri became the dominant political figure in the North; later Joseph Lagu was able to draw together various groups within the southern resistance.

The war ended in a negotiated settlement, the Addis Ababa Accords of 1972 (a good account of this process is Rothchild & Hartzell, 1993). The terms were a single

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[1] The dataset used in Licklider (1995) was labeled version 1.2; this analysis uses version 2.1. A civil war was defined as a conflict in which the leaders of at least one side were concerned about having to cohabit a state with the other side, there was multiple sovereignty, and at least 1,000 battle deaths occurred in one year. A civil war was coded as having ended when either the multiple sovereignty had ended or there were less than 1,000 battle deaths for five consecutive years. A negotiated settlement was any agreement which each side could have rejected and carried on the war.

national government with a great deal of local autonomy for the South, including an elected Southern Regional Assembly and a High Executive Council appointed by the President whose leader would run the region and be the Second-Vice President of the country. The armies would be merged to form a common force in the South. Sudan would be a secular, not an Islamic, state. A constitution was adopted in 1973, incorporating the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement, although the fit was a little odd because the constitution otherwise called for a centralized state with a single political party on the Eastern European model while the South was a multi-party state with a strong legislature. Nonetheless, this system was established and functioned for a decade and Lagu became one of its major political figures. The Sudanese case became a model for how violent civil wars could be ended (Mitchell, 1989: 32; Sylvester, 1977).

However, the settlement did not last. Within eleven years, the Sudanese government had violated the Addis Ababa Accords, and the second Sudanese civil war began, with essentially the same sides and issues. Ostensibly the issues had changed, since the rebels now demanded a more democratic political system throughout Sudan as a whole rather than secession. However, 'it is widely recognized that the overwhelming majority of southeners would opt for separation ... the driving force for the fighting men and women has clearly been separation' (Deng, 1995: 19–20). It therefore seems reasonable to regard Sudan II as a continuation of Sudan I.

On the surface the lesson is clear – negotiated settlements do not hold as well as military victories, presumably because the organizational structures left in place make renewal of violence a constant possibility, undermining conventional politics (Licklider, 1995; Wagner, 1993). If we look at the *process* by which this occurred, things are not so simple. This is not simply a case of two sides eager to renew their unfinished war and the outcome was not desired by most of the players. Instead the settlement seems to collapse as an unanticipated consequence of internal political tensions within the northern elite. This in turn may suggest agenda items for negotiated settlements of other civil wars.

The central puzzle is why Nimeiri, who had negotiated the original settlement and had received much praise for doing so, undermined the agreement to such an extent that the war began again. At the time, a senior member of an American intelligence agency suggested to Licklider that Nimeiri 'had simply gone crazy'. While he did at times exhibit signs of megalomania, a more plausible explanation is the political problem with which he was confronted. Basically, his authorship of the settlement gained him support from groups who could not help him stay in power, and the people whom he thought were necessary to propitiate in order for him to stay in power were willing to put the settlement at risk for their own ends. To put it differently, the problem was not that he thought he was invulnerable but that he appeared to have acted increasingly out of a feeling of acute vulnerability.

As a result of the settlement, Nimeiri became quite popular in the South. However, the agreement had essentially allowed southeners to establish their own regional government, and southern politicians increasingly preferred to stay there rather than work in the less hospitable central government in Khartoum (Woodward, 1990: 144–146). Similarly, Nimeiri became popular on the international scene, especially with the US government, both because of the settlement and even more so because of his support of the Camp David Accords (Deng, 1995: 376). In the short

term this appears to have gained him some extra credit with the International Monetary Fund (Woodward, 1990: 178), but it did not help him in Khartoum, which is where it mattered.

The increasing dissatisfaction led to a coup attempt in 1976. Although the coup itself failed, in retrospect it seems to have been a turning point. The coup involved a complex of people and motives, but one element certainly was the leadership by Islamists, people committed to the idea of making Sudan an Islamic state, an idea which most southeners rejected.

Apparently, Nimeiri was persuaded by the coup that his political support in the North was weak, although the army had ultimately supported him (Deng, 1995: 374; Woodward, 1990: 151–153, 163). He responded to this by a 'national reconciliation' with the Muslim coup leaders in 1977, inviting them back and giving them government positions. He increasingly supported making Sudan an Islamic state and began to reduce southern autonomy. While this response seems unusual, the logic underlying it may have been the same as that of the Addis Ababa Agreement – faced with dangerous enemies whom he could not defeat, he cut a deal with them. Unfortunately, the two deals would directly contradict one another, a useful reminder that negotiation and compromise do not always lead to stable societies.

At about the same time, after a few years of real promise, Nimeiri's economic development schemes began to collapse as a result of ineptitude and corruption; economic conditions were getting worse than before the civil war started as the infrastructure disintegrated (Al-Sahai, 1991: 154–155; Khalid, 1990: 273; Sylvester, 1977: 182; Wakoson, 1993: 44; Woodward, 1990: 156–157, 177). This made him more dependent on the Islamist groups for pol-

itical support. One of the few bright spots was the economic activity driven by Islamic banks, funded by Arab money, which further strengthened the hand of the Islamists (Deng, 1995: 378–380; Woodward, 1990: 168–170). Even the discovery of oil did not help, because much of the oil was in the south, and the government changed the Addis Ababa boundaries, probably in order to retain control of this new resource, outraging southern opinion in the process (Badal, 1986: 147–150; Khalid, 1990: 275). At the same time, the South was increasingly divided internally (with Lagu representing the second largest ethnic group) and was entirely dependent on the North for finance (Wakoson, 1993: 44; Khalid, 1990: 329).

A watershed year was 1983. Nimeiri unilaterally redivided the South into three separate states, a violation of the central pillar of the Addis Ababa Accords, to weaken the South politically; he apparently thought he could get away with it because Lagu supported this action (Khalid, 1990: 301). Shortly thereafter, Nimeiri announced that sharia, the Muslim legal system, would apply throughout Sudan. Southern troops refused to move to the North (the order was another violation of the peace agreement) and went into opposition. The second Sudanese civil war (or the second round of the first one) began. Ironically, all of this did not save Nimeiri, who was overthrown in 1985, but the war continues.

Comments on Sudan
We usually assume that the central problem of ending a civil war is to avoid conflict between the two former adversaries. Indeed, a negotiated settlement is attractive in part because it represents precisely a new political coalition of former enemies which may be carried over into the successor regime, in this case Nimeiri and the southern political leaders. However, this case also suggests

another possibility, that an anti-settlement coalition of former enemies may also emerge (here the Islamists in the North and Lagu from the South) which may be stronger politically.

Why did this happen in the Sudan? First, decentralization allowed southern politicians to stay in their own regional government and denied Nimeiri the support of the only group in society deeply committed to the settlement. This is likely to be a problem in any decentralized regime resulting from a negotiated settlement. Second, divisions among southern politicians encouraged Lagu in particular to support weakening the South in order to strengthen his own position. Third, the collapse of the economy made Nimeiri particularly vulnerable. This was directly caused by the incompetence and corruption of the Sudanese government, abetted by Nimeiri's idiosyncratic and heavy-handed control, and reinforced by the problems of Third World countries after the oil crisis of 1973–74. However, it is possible that more serious attention by outsiders to the economic health of the country after 1972 might have allowed Nimeiri to avoid adopting Islamist policies if he had wanted to do so. The decisions to make peace in 1972 and war in 1983 were both initiated by the Sudanese, with little outside input. But the case suggests that the third party strategy of working hard to achieve a negotiated settlement and then losing interest and reducing support for the new government is a risky one indeed.

Zimbabwe 1982–87: The Matabeleland Conflict

While the 1980 Lancaster House negotiated settlement and constitution, which brought an end to the civil war (and to Rhodesia), laid the framework for black majority rule, it also provided some ironclad guarantees for the white minority.[2] The settlement was a success: the transition to black rule went remarkably smoothly, the public sector was largely 'Africanized', and the guarantees gave the whites who remained in Zimbabwe a vested interest in the new regime's stability and development. Under Robert Mugabe's leadership, the successor regime implemented a policy of reconciliation and accommodation – rather than retribution – towards the white minority, and there has been no renewed violence between whites and blacks to date.

Soon after the settlement of the black–white civil war, however, a black-on-black armed conflict between former civil war allies began in the Matabeleland region in southwestern Zimbabwe. The new antagonists were the two major politico-military organizations that had fought to bring Ian Smith's Rhodesia to an end: Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU, and Mugabe's ZANU.[3] During the civil war, the two parties and their leaders, although personal and ideological rivals, were allied in the Patriotic Front (PF).[4] By the end of the war, ZANU

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[2] White overrepresentation in parliament was entrenched for seven years; the pensions of white civil servants were to be guaranteed by the new regime; and no property could be acquired and redistributed by the government unless there was both a 'willing seller' and a 'willing buyer', and then compensation was to be at fair market prices and in foreign currency. The property rights provision was entrenched in the constitution for ten years. Despite tremendous racially based land inequality and the successor regime's promises of major land redistribution, these provisions would effectively prohibit the new regime from implementing any substantive redistribution for at least a decade (Ohlson & Stedman, 1994: 201–202).

[3] The military arm of ZANU (the Zimbabwe African National Union) was ZANLA (Zimbabwean National Liberation Army). The military arm of ZAPU (the Zimbabwe African People's Union) was ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army).

[4] The rivalry between the two men and the two parties dates back to the founding of ZANU in 1963 as an alternative independence movement to ZAPU. The two organizations were linked to different ethnic groups: ZANU and its ZANLA troops (who did the bulk of the fighting in the Rhodesian war) comprised, and obtained most of their support from, the majority Shona-speaking community. ZAPU and ZIPRA, on the other hand, received most of their support and recruits from the

and its military arm (which had carried out most of the fighting against the Rhodesian Forces) controlled approximately three-quarters of Zimbabwean territory, while ZAPU controlled Matabeleland, its home region.

For Zimbabwe's first democratic elections, held in accordance with Lancaster House in 1980, Mugabe and Nkomo ran on separate tickets. To almost everyone's surprise, Mugabe won 57 of the 80 seats designated for the black majority. Although some ZAPU officials, including Nkomo himself, served in Mugabe's ZANU-PF government from 1980–82, the political rivalry between the two leaders and their organizations soon turned sour and violent. Ohlson and Stedman (1994: 89) suggest that 'Mugabe's decision to jettison Nkomo and ZAPU for the post-Lancaster House elections set the stage for a bloody struggle between the two parties'.

While the new Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA) was in the process of being formed, the armed forces of ZANLA and ZIPRA were not fully disarmed or demobilized. As tensions increased in the demobilization camps, skirmishes between them also broke out. In early 1982, caches of enough weaponry to arm a battalion, including surface-to-air missiles, were found on properties linked to Nkomo and his ZAPU/ZIPRA organizations. By the end of that year, several thousand ZIPRA fighters had deserted from the ZNA, many with their arms. In rural Matabeleland (Nkomo's homeland), where poverty among black farmers and peasants was extreme, organized

Ndebele-speakers of Matabeleland. In addition, each had different international and regional sponsors: ZANU was aided by China and sheltered by Mozambique; ZAPU received the patronage of the Soviet Union, and the safe haven of Zambia. From the beginning, the two organizations differed 'over strategy, tactics, and purpose, which persisted into independence. Neither the common enemy nor the shared overall objective of liberation could bridge the divide' (DuToit, 1995: 142).

violence and banditry broke out against both government and wealthy white settler targets.

ZANU-PF saw these actions as a blatant challenge to its authority and to its new (and still unsteady) political relationship with the white minority. Convinced that the attacks were orchestrated by Nkomo, Mugabe dismissed Nkomo from his ministerial position and had top ZAPU and ZIPRA officials placed under arrest. Government forces were dispatched to Matabeleland to put down the rebels (known as the 'dissidents'), in a campaign that would last from 1982 until the end of 1987.[5] Throughout this period, despite the political persecution of its party leaders and the government's military campaign in its home region, the ZAPU MPs continued to act as a parliamentary opposition to the Mugabe regime (albeit a relatively ineffective one).

Significantly, one of the military's missions in Matabeleland was to protect white commercial farmers from attack (*Africa South of the Sahara*, 1993: 966). While the dissidents' major targets were ZANU-PF government facilities and personnel, some of their frustration was vented on the large-scale commercial landowners living in their midst. The former Rhodesians, in place on the land for less than a century, were benefiting far more from the post-Lancaster House reality than was the native population of Matabeleland; during the conflict, dozens would be kidnaped and/or killed. The

[5] The dissidents, numbering at different times between 300 and 3,000, primarily comprised ex-ZIPRA fighters who had never been demobilized, or who had deserted from the ZNA (Alao, 1995: 109–110; Kriger, 1995: 149–150; Stedman, 1993: 160–161; Sylvester 1991, 75–77). The dissidents may have received material and financial support from South Africa, which was vehemently opposed to the Mugabe regime. At the very least, the ZANU-PF government believed that there was a South African connection, and this led it to view the dissidents as a serious threat to the regime's security and to act accordingly (Hodder-Williams, 1983: 7–9; Lawyers' Committee, 1986: 7; Ohlson & Stedman, 1994: 202; Sylvester, 1991: 77–78).

regime had a clear interest in placating the whites, particularly in the early years of Zimbabwean independence. While most hardline 'Rhodies' had fled with their money, those whites who remained, including many who were willing to give the new Zimbabwe a chance, dominated the economy in all its sectors (as they still do to this day) (DuToit, 1995: 91, 147). The Mugabe regime had to address white fears and discourage (wealthy) white flight. Mugabe was acting before domestic and international audiences, all concerned with how the whites would be treated in the post-civil war environment; white Zimbabweans, South Africa, and the West – including its lending institutions – were all watching. The regime's policy of protecting white farmers and fighting their tormentors signaled that it was adhering to the terms of the settlement, in spirit as well as in letter. This policy also indicated to the demographically shrinking white Zimbabwean community that it could be safe, and even thrive, under black-majority rule. Thus, in order to placate and protect his former white enemy, Mugabe assaulted constituent elements of his former black civil war ally: Nkomo's ZAPU/ZIPRA and the people of Matabeleland.

The government accused Nkomo and ZAPU of being linked to the dissidents, but no actual evidence of a direct link could be found (Hodder-Williams, 1983: 14; Lawyers' Committee, 1986: 20). Indeed, Nkomo and other ZAPU officials consistently and vehemently denounced dissident actions, and denied any connection between the dissidents and ZAPU (Hodder-Williams, 1983: 6–9; Ranger, 1986: 391–392; Sylvester, 1991: 76). However, there were clearly some connections between the dissidents, Nkomo, and ZAPU/ZIPRA; for example, dissident actions and killings declined before the 1985 parliamentary elections when Nkomo was expected to do well and subsequently increased following the

unfavorable results (Lawyers' Committee, 1986: 25–27). 'The conflict in Matabeleland stemmed from claims by former ZAPU members that they had been reduced to political impotence' (Ohlson & Stedman, 1994: 90). The dissidents' 'central grievances rested on a perception that the Ndebele people, and especially ZIPRA ex-combatants, were being discriminated against and excluded from power' (Kriger, 1995: 149).

Over the years, 'the cumulative attacks on ZAPU drove Nkomo into a series of on-again, off-again negotiations with ZANU officials' (Sylvester, 1991: 77). Both sides had an interest in coming to terms and ending the political and military struggle. ZAPU had not made any clear gains in its policy of opposing the Mugabe regime and feared becoming ever more marginal in Zimbabwean politics, and Nkomo had himself grown 'tired of his exile from formal political power' (Ohlson & Stedman, 1994: 91). Mugabe and the ZANU-PF needed to bring the violence to a halt, in order to encourage white commercial farmers to remain in Matabeleland and to remove any excuse for South African intervention (Ohlson & Stedman, 1994: 91). In December 1987, the two sides signed a national unity pact. In accordance with this negotiated settlement, Nkomo and other ZAPU leaders were brought back into the government, and ZAPU was to be merged into ZANU-PF. A general amnesty was issued to the dissidents in May 1988 and the parties were merged in December 1989 (just in time for the next parliamentary elections). Following the signing of the unity accords, the fighting ceased in Matabeleland (Ohlson & Stedman, 1994: 90–91; Ranger, 1989: 161; Stedman, 1993: 160–161; Sylvester, 1991: 83–84).[6]

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[6] Despite all the denials of any connection between the armed dissidents and ZAPU/ZIPRA, organized dissidence did in fact come to a halt once Mugabe and Nkomo reached political agreement in December 1987.

The Mugabe regime became fully consolidated after 1987, once the national unity pact was signed and, coincidentally, once the Lancaster House constitution's guarantee of reserved white seats in parliament ended. The ZANU–ZAPU negotiated settlement and merger led to the elimination of the main organized black opposition to Mugabe's and ZANU-PF's rule and greatly facilitated Zimbabwe's move toward a de facto one-party state. In the most recent elections in 1995, ZANU-PF was able to claim 148 of the 150 seats in the expanded legislature. As Ohlson and Stedman (1994: 126) observe, the Matabeleland war was 'resolved at the cost of multi-party democracy in the country'.

Comments on Zimbabwe

Nkomo, ZAPU/ZIPRA, and the dissidents in Matabeleland felt they did not get their just desserts, and they acted accordingly. Their resentments (and thus, the political-military conflict) had two dimensions, one psychological, and the other material. ZAPU and ZIPRA wanted their part in the liberation struggle to be seen as legitimate, on a par with that of ZANU/ZANLA (Kriger, 1995). Yet with ZANU's increasing hegemony, their role in the struggle, and thus their very legitimacy, was increasingly marginalized. They resented their exclusion from the official narrative of Zimbabwean history, and the practical (political and economic) repercussions that this exclusion produced. Technically, the 'losers' in the civil war were the whites, who lost Rhodesia. Yet they fared far better economically than did the people of Matabeleland (whom the Nkomo side represented), and Mugabe was clearly more responsive to the whites' political fears and concerns than he was to those of his former allies in the civil war.

While the 1987 unity accord effectively eliminated the main black opposition party by merging it into ZANU-PF (much to Mugabe's benefit), it was also an act of national reconciliation and inclusion: it brought the other black liberation movement back into the fold. In so doing, major grievances were addressed. ZAPU/ZIPRA's place in the liberation struggle of the past was legitimized, thus ensuring a role for its members in Zimbabwe's future. The spoils of victory (including, not insignificantly, participation in black majority-rule) were more evenly distributed. However, all this was mostly to the benefit of a new black Zimbabwean political and economic elite tied to the unified ZANU-PF government, and not the masses (Weiss, 1994). The government's ambitious land redistribution plans of the 1990s have turned out to be more of a promise than a reality, and they have become a new avenue for government corruption, with some of the land taken from whites being turned over to ruling party officials (including some ex-ZAPU stalwarts) rather than to the poor and landless peasants those leaders ostensibly represent (Meldrum, 1995).

Chad 1989 to Present: Too Much Power-Sharing, Disaffection, and Habré's Overthrow

Inter-ally conflicts erupted as Chad's civil war was ending in 1989, leading to President Hissene Habre's overthrow two years later by his (former) comrade-in-arms, Idriss Deby. A similar but ultimately less destabilizing dynamic accompanied the early years of Deby's own rule as well. The terms of conflict among former allies in Chad during both regimes appear at once to be both less clear-cut, and less enduring, than those of the other cases examined here, due in large part to how the civil war ended. In the case of Chad, there was no single negotiated settlement that brought the civil war to a conclusion. Rather, there were numerous settlements between Hissene Habré and a

variety of armed factions in the North and South. When Habré and his Armed Forces of the North (FAN) captured N'djamena in June 1982, the Libyan-backed President Goukouni Oueddei, Habré's main northern rival (and former comrade in FROLINAT, the original anti-colonial rebel group), was driven out of the capital. Following this victory, Habré declared himself the new president, and went on to forge his own Chadian regime through both warfare and negotiated settlements. He did this increasingly from a position of strength: the more consolidated and powerful his regime became, the more of an upper hand he had in negotiations with the remaining rebel factions. This process had a snowball effect, as 'minor leader after minor leader cut a deal [with Habré] to return to N'djamena' (Foltz, 1995: 22).[7]

One of Habré's standard tactics was to distribute cabinet positions to the leaders of rebel groups who joined his side. Many civil service and parastatal positions were also assigned based on political or factional affiliations, with 'technical competence' a far lesser concern (Foltz, 1995: 26). By March 1989, Habré's national unity government had bulged to an unprecedented 26 ministers and 11 junior ministers. Another standard procedure was to incorporate the various ex-rebel forces (often affiliated with different tribes or clans) into a growing, national army, and to provide the rebel commanders with high-ranking military positions. In this manner, Habré deliberately transformed his own guerrilla group, the FAN, into the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT), going so far as to remove

the name North from the army's title, in a symbolic bid for national unity (*Africa Today,* 1996: 569; Foltz, 1995: 22).

By the late 1980s, Habré had consolidated his hold over most of the country, the major exception being the Aouzou Strip along Libya's border, which was still controlled by Qadhafi's forces (Miles, 1995b: 43). The Habré regime made little pretense of democracy, nor did it strive to create democratic institutions. There was only one official party – Habré's. All others were banned. During and after the civil war, Habré billed himself as a Chadian nationalist, concerned only with unifying his country and driving out the foreign occupier on Chad's northern border. Libya was portrayed as the common enemy of all Chadians, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or tribal affiliation.

Ironically, however, it was after his regime was consolidated that things started to fall apart for Habré. With the common enemy of a newly unified Chad now humiliated and driven out of most of the country, Habré's ability to hold his coalition of diverse political, ethnic, and tribal groupings together began to wane. This was compounded by Habré's increasing brutality, especially in his dealings with tribal groupings other than his own Gorane.

Habré was driven out of power by some of his wartime allies – not his former enemies – who had been nursing serious grievances against his rule. He was ultimately overthrown by those involved in the failed coup attempt of 1 April 1989; they were long-time members of Habré's inner circle, not members of outside rebel groups. The 'April 1st Group' had been led by three men: Idriss Deby, his previous army chief of staff; Mahamat Itno, Habré's interior minister and his personal negotiator with rebel factions; and Hassan Djamous, the FANT chief of staff and mastermind of Habré's victories against Libya. Following the

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[7] The consolidation of Habré's regime quickly accelerated after his victories against Qadhafi in the so-called 'Toyota pick-up truck war' of 1987, in which all Libyan positions south of the disputed Aouzou Strip were eradicated by fast-moving Chadian forces armed primarily with truck-mounted heavy machine guns. Habré's prestige (both domestic and international) increased greatly thereafter.

attempted coup, Itno was arrested and never seen again; Deby and Djamous fled to Sudan with their men, hotly pursued by Habré's army. Djamous died of his wounds. Deby, receiving aid from Libya, took charge of 'Islamic Legionnaires', wandering armed bandits and remnants of the Chadian opposition and welded them into a coherent, threatening force' (*Africa Today*, 1996: 572). Deby's group, the Patriotic Movement for Salvation (MPS) launched a series of attacks against FANT installations, defeating Habré's troops in the field. The French expeditionary force, long stationed in Chad to bolster the francophone regime, did not intervene. Instead, France abandoned Habré in his hour of need. Habré fled the country on 1 December 1990. Idriss Deby became the new head of state within a matter of days.

Habré had made too many concessions in the name of national reconciliation, and too many choice positions had gone to former rebels.[8] This, combined with Habré's brutality against his allies' ethnic groups, provided incentive for his overthrow. The April 1st Group leaders 'had been increasingly critical of both domination of Habré's own [tribal faction], and of the reconciliation, which seemed to deprive them of the fruits of victory' ('Chad: Coup Attempt Crushed', 1989: 9256; cf. Joffe, 1990: 176). They also opposed Habré's despotism, and called for a democratic regime. The appointment of the ex-rebel Omar as foreign minister was a more notable example of what was seen by many insiders as a disturbing pattern in Habré's reconciliation policy: awarding former enemies, at the expense of Habré's

allies. Some army officers, who had fought the Libyans, were particularly upset that former pro-Libyan faction leaders had influence within the Habré government ('Chad: Coup Attempt Crushed', 1989: 9255). In the end, 'Habré's regime failed at its political center: the FAN core cracked along ethnic and family lines' (Foltz, 1995: 29).

From the beginning of his rule in December 1990, President Deby sought to be different from Habré, promising an end to regime violence against the populace, and vowing to implement a transition to multi-party democracy. Despite Habré's overthrow, however, 'the dissension which had plagued Chad for so long had not ended' (*Africa Today*, 1996: 573). With Deby in and Habré out, the two men and their followers switched roles. Now, Habré's former loyalists (particularly those opposed to Deby and Zaghawa rule) became the rebels, and the Deby regime fought to subdue them (as well as other rebel factions in both the North and South). The bloodiest military encounters during Deby's rule occurred in the early 1990s, between government forces and the new pro-Habré, anti-Deby rebel faction, the Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD).[9]

Deby, taking a page from Habré's playbook, pursued a policy of reconciliation with rebel factions, and in the early 1990s, various groups abandoned their struggle and joined the Deby regime. His first cabinet was larger than Habré's last, with 33 ministers, including a few holdovers from the previous regime (*Africa Today*, 1996: 572). Yet, particularly in the early years of his rule, Deby had problems with his own allies; ironically, the grievances against Deby were

[8] In November 1988, Interior Minister Itno represented Habré in negotiations with southener Acheich ibn Omar (the leader of the CDR, the last major rebel group fighting against the Habré government). Much to Itno's surprise, however, following the settlement Habré appointed Omar as his new foreign minister (Joffe, 1990: 176). Itno, who later became one of the plotters against Habré, was said to have greatly resented such a prize going to a former enemy ('Chad: Coup Attempt Crushed', 1989: 9255).

[9] The Deby regime and the MDD guerillas claimed to have inflicted substantial casualties in numerous engagements in 1992 and 1993, but both Miles (1997) and Foltz (1997) suggest that these skirmishes do not likely meet the threshold of 1,000 battle deaths which are necessary for them to be classified as a civil war by our definition.

similar to those the April 1st Group had against Habré.[10]

Members of Deby's own Zaghawa tribal group also became resentful of Deby's power-sharing. Even though he 'elevated many Zaghawa to key ministerial positions', and the Zaghawa dominated Deby's rebel army at the time of the overthrow, they had since 'felt sidelined by the president, who had committed himself to introducing multiparty democracy', even if at the expense of Zaghawan interests. Such resentment boiled over in April 1992, 'when hundreds of troops ... encircled the palace in light tanks and threatened to storm it' ('Chad: Accusations of Killings', 1992: 10546).

Although both post-civil war rulers have had similar problems with respect to allies falling out, Deby's fate has not been the same as Habré's. The difference may lie in the fact that eventually (and however reluctantly) Deby, who was never as brutal as Habré, began to follow through on his long-standing promises of multi-party democracy. For several years, the Deby regime seemed to totter back and forth between its democratic and its authoritarian tendencies. However, in 1996 and 1997, a constitutional referendum and a series of multi-party elections (both legislative and presidential) were held, although they were reportedly marred by fraud. Deby's MPS party, after winning only a plurality of seats in the National Assembly, formed a coalition

government with an opposition party (*Elections in Chad*, 1997). The negotiated settlements between the Deby regime and numerous rebel factions in the early 1990s, although shaky at first, seem to be holding. Many of the former fighters have joined (or formed their own) political parties, and some of Chad's traditional chaos has been transferred from the bush to the burgeoning political system.

Comments on Chad

Habré had gone out of his way to avoid creating 'powerful losers' as he brought rebel leaders into his fold, giving them a stake in the regime via patronage and spoils. Ironically, however, powerful losers did emerge, but from *within* the regime, and they brought about Habré's fall. Habré's policy of reconciliation and integration proved superficial – and even destabilizing – after the unifying, common enemy (Libya) was defeated. In the end, Habré was not overthrown by the former enemies he negotiated with, but by members of his original armed faction (the FAN), who were dissatisfied or felt threatened by those settlements. 'The reentry of former enemies into the country and their formal incorporation into the institutions of the state created a problem of security for the regime' (Nolutshungu, 1996: 235–236). Habré's negotiated settlements may have been successful in 'ending' the civil war (and bringing the death count below 1,000), but they were not able or sufficient to keep his regime in place.

Deby came to power through a military victory over Habré in the field. Afterwards he entered into numerous negotiated settlements with rebel groups, including a newly formed group loyal to the deposed Habré. In the early 1990s, he did not have the kind of success enjoyed by Habré in 1987–88. However, Deby was not as ruthless as Habré, nor did he have the Libyan antago-

[10] The falling out among allies under Deby took the same initial form as it had in the previous regime: on 13 October 1991, less than a year after Deby's takeover, a coup was attempted. The plotters were led by the man who 'had been considered the number two man in the regime', Interior Minister Maldoum Bada Abbas, a member of the Hadjerai clan of eastern Chad (*Africa Today*, 1996: 573). The Hadjerai, crucial supporters of Deby in his overthrow of Habré, felt they were not receiving the promised level of representation in the army and government. Abbas himself 'felt slighted by the [new regime's] division of powers, and claimed more posts for his men, the victims of severe repression under Hissene Habré' ('Chad: Coup Attempt Brings Reprisals', 1991: 10310).

nists as a common cause to rally the country around. His own policy of reconciliation with the ubiquitous rebel factions caused dissension within his own ranks. In the case of Habré, such dissension became his downfall; in Deby's case, a similar end has been forestalled so far by a relatively greater tolerance of political dissent and the apparent move toward multi-party democracy.

Lebanon 1989 to Present: Intra-Maronite Civil War After the Ta'if Accords

Following the 1958 Lebanese civil war, conflicts among civil war allies mainly took the form of political maneuvering and shifting alliances in parliament. Intra-ally bloodshed was insignificant until after the second civil war began in 1975. On the Rightist side (known as the Lebanese Front (LF), with its main militia, the Lebanese Forces), there were many violent struggles among Maronite allies. On the Leftist/Muslim side, much of the fighting was between longstanding members and newer challengers: the Druze versus the Palestinians, and the Palestinians versus the newly mobilized Shi'ites (Amal and Hizbollah, who also fought battles among themselves).

In 1989, the Ta'if Accords were signed, ending the 1975–90 Lebanese civil war. They formally recognized Lebanon's 'special relationship' with Syria, a relationship that would later be institutionalized with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed by the two countries in May 1991, which made Syria a guarantor of the security provisions of the Ta'if settlement. The Accords called for the extension and reestablishment of Lebanese government control over the entire country, via the dismantling and disarming of the sectarian militias (with the help of Syria); and called for the redeployment of Syrian forces to the Beka'a valley (*Europa World Yearbook*, 1996: 1937;

Norton, 1991: 461). They called for constitutional changes that would increase the political power of the Muslim majority (at the expense of the Christians, especially the Maronites) and for closer, formal ties with Syria. Unlike several previous proposals aimed at ending the war, the Ta'if Accords had been drafted and approved by the bulk of the (surviving) Lebanese legislators. Sixty-two MPs, half of them Muslim, the other half Christian, were involved in the process, providing Ta'if with a unique political legitimacy.

In addition to parliamentarians from both sides, the Muslim side of the civil war divide, except for Hizbollah, supported the agreement. While the Druze and Amal militias were not happy with the Ta'if provision that called for their own disarming (Hiro, 1992: 166), they did not take up arms to resist its implementation. Division over the Ta'if Accords within the Lebanese Front, however, sparked the bloodiest, and final, intra-Maronite clashes of the sixteen year civil war. General Michel 'Awn (aka Aoun), chief of staff of the Lebanese Army, rejected the Accords and ordered the parliament that accepted them dissolved. 'Awn did not want to give up his own executive power, and demanded that the Syrian military forces pull out of Lebanon entirely before any constitutional changes were made. He rejected the legitimacy of the new Maronite president, Elias Hrawi (whose election followed the agreement at Ta'if), and refused to relinquish his political and military positions when ordered to do so by the new president.

Other Maronite leaders, however, took a decidedly different stance. Samir Ja'ja, who by this time was in full command of the Lebanese Forces militia, along with the Phalange Party, the Maronite Patriarch, and the Chamoun clan's National Liberal Party, had reluctantly accepted the Accords, and eventually all declared their allegiance to President Hrawi. For these leaders the

handwriting was on the wall. The Accords' political reforms were, in part, an inevitable outcome of the Maronites' ever increasing minority status in Lebanon, driven by the twin wartime processes of massive Christian emigration and increased Muslim (especially Shi'a) birthrates. With the economy in the Christian and Muslim sectors in shambles, if the war continued the Maronites' position would only weaken further. Had these leaders decided to reject the settlement and continue the war, they would be on their own. With Israel preoccupied in the south, and with Syria dominant in all other parts of Lebanon, they could count on little outside support. Indeed, regional and international actors (including the Arab League states, the United States, and the United Nations) had endorsed Ta'if; the USA was willing to tolerate Syrian intervention in Lebanon in part because of Syria's participation in the Gulf War coalition against Iraq. Thus, while the Maronite leaders may have objected to the terms of the settlement, any resistance would be futile. Finally, the Accords would mean peace and reconstruction; the alternative was the destruction of Lebanon. Ultimately, all major Maronite leaders, with the exception of General 'Awn, were willing to accede to the Ta'if negotiated settlement. An unlikely (if implicit) alliance was thus formed between these leaders (and their Christian followers), the Muslim militias, and the Syrians, all of whom opposed 'Awn's obstructionist tactics.

The post-Ta'if round of fighting between 'Awn's renegade army and the LF militia was more brutal than earlier clashes. The General began by attacking supporters or defenders of Ta'if (including a physical assault on the Maronite Patriarch); after Ja'ja announced his support for the Accords, 'Awn struck against the (Christian) Lebanese Forces (Norton, 1991: 466–467). But the LF was in a better military position than 'Awn had thought, and it was able to hold its

own. In less than three weeks in January and February 1990, 770 troops were killed in skirmishes between the two predominantly Maronite forces (Hiro, 1992: 173). 'This intra-Maronite war turned out to be one of the most destructive of all the rounds, causing more casualties in 18 days than had occurred during six months of artillery bombardment by the Syrians in 1989' (Winslow, 1996: 276).

A ceasefire in May left the LF in control of strategic locations, with 'Awn surrounded. In the fighting between January and May, over 1,000 troops had been killed, 'mostly Maronite' (Winslow, 1996: 278). Many of 'Awn's officers defected to the Lebanese army, now under the command of General Emile Lahoud, loyal to President Hrawi. During this period, Hrawi made numerous overtures to 'Awn to come out and join the government, all of which 'Awn rejected (Winslow, 1996: 278). The armed resistance to the Ta'if settlement finally came to an end on 13 October 1990, when Syrian forces intervened at the request of President Hrawi: the Syrian army and air force, in coordination with Lahoud's Lebanese army, attacked 'Awn's positions. By the end of that day, there were between 750–800 Lebanese dead and 1,000 wounded (Hiro, 1992: 181; Winslow, 1996: 279). Four-hundred and sixty Syrian troops were also killed. 'It was the bloodiest single engagement of the entire war, and it was decisive' (Winslow, 1996: 279). 'Awn sought refuge in Beirut's French Embassy. Within days of his defeat, the Lebanese Armed Forces began to dismantle the barricades that delineated the Green Line. The process of the reunification of Lebanon had begun. 'Awn had delayed the implementation of the Ta'if Accords , but as much as he had tried, he had not been able to stop it. Following Elias Hrawi's election as president, Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss formed a national unity government of 14 ministers,

comprising seven Muslims and seven Christians. While the LF and 'Awn's forces battled, Hrawi and Hoss' government went about implementing elements of the Ta'if settlement. In September 1990, with 'Awn's forces still holed up in the Christian enclave, the constitutional amendments called for by Ta'if had been signed into law, and Lebanon's 'Second Republic' became a reality. Two months after 'Awn's defeat, a new 'Government of National Reconciliation', comprising 30 ministers, was formed. An example of power-sharing par excellence, the new cabinet was a 'government of the militias', with former militia leaders offered ministerial portfolios, in the hope that they would 'be willing to exchange paramilitary authority for a role in politics' (Norton, 1991: 467).

Following the political reforms, Beirut was demilitarized. The city's various militias, including Ja'ja's LF, Amal, and the Druze, had turned in their weapons by May 1991. An important factor in the militias' compliance may have been Syria's brutal crushing of 'Awn's forces, which signaled to all other militia leaders what would await them 'if they refused to cooperate' with the terms and implementation of Ta'if (Winslow, 1996: 280). The 'Awn paradigm may have helped to expedite the disarming of the militias in Beirut and throughout much of Lebanon. If ministerial portfolios were the carrots, Syrian tanks were the sticks.

The Ta'if negotiated settlement has been a success. Although Syrian redeployments have not occurred as promised, and Lebanese sovereignty has not been extended to the South, Ta'if's political and constitutional reforms have largely been implemented. Most significantly, civil war has not resumed. 'While the militia commanders have only partially cooperated with the Hrawi government, they have not taken up arms to oppose it either' (Winslow, 1996: 282). Instead, sixteen years of sectarian

bloodshed has been replaced by political gridlock: 'in practice this carefully calibrated system transforms the business of government into an endless game of negotiations and rivalries, which often ends in a stalemate' (Picard, 1996: 158). So far, such stalemates have been political ones, and have not led to renewed violence.

Comments on Lebanon

While the settlement to the sixteen year Lebanese civil war was a negotiated one, it sparked internecine warfare, and its successful implementation required a quick but harsh military victory at the hands of Syrian forces. A renegade leader, Michel 'Awn, and his loyal troops sought to stop the implementation of the settlement, even if this meant taking on those who had fought on their side in the civil war. 'Awn was seen as a hero by many in the Maronite enclave. Besides his own personal ambition, he was fighting for the status quo ante, which no longer existed; his vision of Lebanon harkened back to the days when the Maronites were the ruling majority in a unified state, and the country was free of Syrian occupation. Like most Maronites, 'Awn was acutely aware that the Ta'if settlement would reduce the power of the Christian Lebanese. Unlike the others, he was willing to take up arms to prevent this from happening. His resistance to the settlement was ultimately crushed by brutal third party intervention, at the behest of the newly, democratically elected Maronite president. With 'Awn's defeat, Lebanon could begin a return to normality, through reconstruction and reconciliation.

Conclusion

Conventionally, when trying to end a civil war, we focus on the relations between the groups doing the fighting. The implication is that resolving this conflict will prevent a

renewed outbreak of civil war. The cases dis-
cussed above suggest that this assumption is
at best oversimplified and at worst seriously
misleading. Societies in civil war are often
driven by a whole variety of conflicts.
Outsiders typically do not get involved in
conflict resolution until one or more of these
divisions has resulted in large-scale violence.
They focus on the particular conflict which
seems to have produced war. In doing so,
they privilege this particular conflict
relationship on the not unreasonable
grounds that this conflict, not others, has
resulted in large-scale violence. But they may
also assume that this conflict is the only one
which will result in war and this is often a
mistake. They may also tacitly assume that
wartime allies will remain so indefinitely and
that no new disputes or conflicts will arise
after a successful settlement. These cases
suggest that, even if the 'primary' conflict is
handled, others may come to the fore-
ground. To put it differently, outsiders
should worry about conflict resolution and
power-sharing among allies as much as
among adversaries; even if this interferes
with the seemingly immediate task of ending
the violence, it may contribute to reduced
violence in the future.

Several other points emerge from this
article. We do not believe that violence is
inevitable after civil wars. Of the four coun-
tries, these 'second-order' conflicts among
former allies only escalated to our arbitrary
level of 'war' (1,000 battle deaths per year,
etc.) in Zimbabwe and Lebanon. Casualties
in Chad never seem to have reached this
level and there was very little physical viol-
ence between the northern factions in
Sudan.

Moreover, even if large-scale violence
occurs, the civil war settlement need not col-
lapse. Indeed, one could make the opposite
argument based on these cases. The highest
levels of violence were in Zimbabwe and
Lebanon, but these 'second-order wars' were

in fact a (necessary) prelude to more secure
settlements. This may also have happened in
Chad, even though the reported violence is
less. Ironically the *impact* of conflict among
allies on civil war settlement was probably
greatest in Sudan where the level of violence
was the lowest, but where Nimeiri's reaction
to it (i.e. bringing Islamist groups into his
government) changed government policy
and led directly to a renewal of the original
civil war. We are not arguing that war is a
good thing, but it is interesting to speculate
that if Nimeiri had used more force to crush
the Islamist forces after the 1976 coup the
second Sudanese civil war might not have
erupted, and the large-scale violence in
Zimbabwe and Lebanon may have helped to
solidify rather than undercut civil war settle-
ments.

Presumably, one of the keys is to dis-
tribute resources (both physical and psychic)
in order to satisfy the major demands of the
individuals and groups who can undermine
the settlement. In practice this often means
responding to elites and ignoring the
demands of the masses based on the prag-
matic calculation that elites are cheaper and
masses by themselves are unlikely to over-
throw the system. 'Elites' here include
former combatants, since armed and orga-
nized people are potentially dangerous to the
new state; Mitchell (1989: 30) notes that the
Sudanese settlement promised jobs in the
new state for members of the rebel forces.
Outsiders can help by providing expertise
and resources; unfortunately the recent
record suggests that outside support is likely
to decline once the conflict is over as gov-
ernments respond to the 'CNN factor'.

One common thread in these cases is dis-
satisfaction with the results of the civil war.
In Chad, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, the dissat-
isfaction that led to inter-ally conflict was
felt most acutely by those who saw them-
selves as the 'victors'. In Lebanon, on the
other hand, while some on the 'winning'

Muslim side were disappointed with the results (i.e. the Shi'ites), the greatest resentment – which ultimately led to renewed civil war – was felt by the Maronites, who had been on the 'losing side' of the war. Former allies sometimes felt that the settlements produced too much power-sharing with the former enemy and too many concessions in the name of national reconciliation. Dissatisfaction and disillusionment is probably common after all wars. It is a particular problem in Third World countries after civil wars because the divisions within society have been deepened, the economy is devastated, fighters cannot cope with civilian life, the instruments of government are weak and distrusted, and third parties stop supplying assistance when it is most needed, i.e. when the fighting stops and the rebuilding begins. Given these conditions, it is surprising that any civil war settlements last at all.

In addition, there are cognitive psychological reasons for such disillusionment. The us/them dichotomy that is constructed (and reified) through civil war simplifies the diversity of groups on either side of that divide. In-group favoritism and out-group homogeneity are cognitive psychological processes that occur once a dividing line has been demarcated (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The antagonists on the other side of the civil war divide become the demonized other that helps hold allies together in their wartime coalition. Once a settlement is reached and the fundamental us/them dichotomy begins to break down, the cohesiveness of groups on either side dissipates, and disputes among allies who are now more cognitively aware of their differences and conflicting interests can easily result.

Concerned third parties need to keep this dynamic in mind as settlements are drafted and implemented. The 'normal' way to deal with such intra-ally disputes is through political institutions. But in the immediate post-civil war environment, such institutions may be non-existent, non-viable, or not perceived as legitimate. Outsiders should not assume either that wartime cooperation will continue in peace or that 'normal' peacetime behavior will naturally appear of its own accord. Indeed they should probably anticipate that ad hoc wartime alliances are likely to dissolve with the risk of renewed civil violence.

There was no discernable pattern of third party involvement in these cases. In Sudan and Zimbabwe, third party influence was marginal at best. In Chad, the French decision not to intervene was important but the major decisions were made by local figures. In Lebanon, on the other hand, Syria was the central force in imposing a settlement. Although the agreement had been crafted by local notables and Syria acted in alliance with local forces, its military action against 'Awn both eliminated a major adversary and sent a clear signal to the other faction leaders. Third parties had more impact on reaching settlements for the original conflicts (crucial in Zimbabwe and Lebanon, significant in Sudan, important as a common enemy in Chad) than in the later struggles which determined whether the settlements would hold.

At one level the idea of former allies opposing one another is a good thing; the standard political recommendation to resolve civil violence is precisely to create a situation where new coalitions form across former societal cleavages. However, outsiders often tacitly assume that such coalitions will support the civil war settlement. This will not occur automatically. Devolution of power to regions is one standard strategy of power-sharing (Sisk, 1996: 49–53). However, the Sudanese example suggests a major problem with this approach; regardless of constitutional provisions, the central government is likely to be critical in providing financial support for such regions (Mitchell, 1989: 27).

Regional politicians must have an incentive to play a role in the central government, allowing them to form a coalition in support of the settlement. If they are denied such a role or choose not to exercise it, a coalition of dissatisfied players, 'powerful losers', may well undermine the settlement.

More broadly, these developments illustrate the fact that it is misleading to talk about political 'reconstruction' after a civil war. Even if it could be done, there is no point in reconstructing the situation that produced civil war in the first place. Instead, the new leadership is faced with a problem of constructing a political unit which can transform conflicts so that they can be routinely handled without large-scale violence. A variety of such techniques were tried in the different cases discussed here, bringing former enemies into the government, merging competing militaries, devolving power to regions, etc., with varying results. In Zimbabwe and Lebanon in particular, the new political unit became consolidated only after intense intra-ally conflict following the civil war settlement.

But this is not an automatic process. Outsiders have understandably been reluctant to get involved in 'political construction' (Kumar, 1997: 4–14); we do not agree how to govern ourselves, much less others. However, we badly need more knowledge about how this process works in particular cases and what similarities and differences connect these different examples. Such studies have a clear policy relevance because they may suggest 'lessons' that can be applied to other cases. At the same time, they push us theoretically back to some of the most fundamental questions in political science, how and when do people come together to form working political units. It is sobering to realize the difficulty in answering these basic questions.

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